S
ince 1989 the radical changes and reforms in Central and Eastern Europe have taken place against an extremely unfavorable background. Large budget and balance-of-payments deficits partly due to a heavy burden of external debt, negative economic growth, the collapse of intra-regional trade and regional markets, external shocks due to the Soviet decision to price oil exports at world market prices aggravated by the Gulf conflict -all helped to send Eastern Europe into an economic slump that can only be compared to a depression on the scale of the 1930s in the West.
Not surprisingly, under these circumstances of fundamental short-term shocks and profound and farreaching long-term investment and restructuring needs, private finance from abroad has been unavailable or insufficient? Risk and insecurity are high while political transformation appears to be far from being stable with rising unemployment and the worsening of the social and general living conditions of the people. Therefore, much of the initial cushioning had to be provided for by the international financial institutions (I FIs), such as the World Bank, the IMF, or-on the European side -the European Communitywith the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Commission's coordinating role in the PHARE-program of the G-24. 2 Nevertheless, Western aid to Eastern Europe has so far mainly consisted of bilateral aid with Germany being in a strong lead. Due to the difficulties with the unification process in Germany, however, even the Germans are now much more cautious.
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They increasingly insist on a spreading of the cost. Given budget constraints and domestic priorities, it seems likely that Western governments will focus more on multilateral support for Eastern Europe in the near future 9
Within the multilateral context, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) that officially began to operate on April 15, 1991 has had the hardest time defending its existence and defining its role in the transformation process in Eastern Europe. This new bank, with the task of rebuilding the shattered economies of Central and Eastern Europe, has been praised by its first president, Frenchman Jacques Attali, as "the first postcold war institution. 9 totally new in terms of its task and its operational tools "3 while its strongest critics have concluded that if it "did not exist, it would not need inventing 9 ''4 This paper looks at the controversy over the creation of the EBRD and analyzes the first steps and orientations of this new bank 9 Why was it created, is it needed at all, what do its first steps reveal and will it find a permanent role in relation to other IFIs? 1 Cf. K.-H. Kleine, E. Thien: TheRoleofthelMFandtheWorld Bank in the former Eastern Bloc Countries, in: INTERECONOMICS, January/February 1992, p. 20.
2 During the G-7 summit in Paris in July 1989, it was decided to coordinate bilateral aid to Poland and Hungary. A larger group, the G-24 made up of the EC and EFTA countries, Canada, the USA, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Turkey, was set up while the Commission of the EC was given the task of coordinator. In September 1989, the "Poland/Hungary Aid for Restructuring of Economies" (PHARE) program stated the priorities for Western aid to Eastern Europe.
3 Speech by the President of the EBRD delivered on 22nd September 1990, at the Bretton Woods Committee in Washington DC, p 9 1 9 4 The Economist, quoted in J.A. B I i n k e n : Jacques of AlITrades, in: The New York Times Magazine, 13 October 1991, p. 47.
The Difficult Creation Process
Jacques Attali, close advisor to the French President, Fran(~ois Mitterrand, has been identified as the spiritual father of the new bank. 5 In the fall of 1989, against the backdrop of radical change in Eastern Europe, he convinced the French President that the West had to act in order to sustain the region's break with communism. Accepting the view that the current problems in Eastern Europe constituted not only a liquidity crisis but a largescale and long-term solvency crisis and that the transformation would probably take decades, large financial flows would have to be channelled via development institutions. As long as private investment was not sufficiently forthcoming, these institutions could provide much-needed technical advice and expertise while monitoring the progress made in the transition.
If one were to attach democratic and economic conditionality (respect for human rights, a true beginning or return to democracy with free elections and the introduction of multi-party systems, the rule of law, the development of market economies) to the financial support, the transition would be set to develop in the Western interest. Creating a new multilateral organization would mobilize additional funds and allow for a common and specific European approach to the problem, thereby channelling and partly controlling the economic and financial might of single members, such as Germany. It was argued that existing I FIs were not flexible enough and that they were located too far away from where the problems really were. ~ After initial informal discussions within the EC, the official initiative for the creation of the EBRD was accepted by the EC heads of government at the European Council meeting in December 1989. The new organization was conceived as European in its basic character and broadly international in its membership, including also the nonEuropean members of the G-24, the seven East European countries, Yugoslavia, Malta, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Mexico, South Korea, Israel, Egypt and Morocco. Stressing the European component of the idea, the EC and the EIB were also included while it was agreed that the EC would control the accumulated majority of shares in the new bank. However, after this start it took more than a year until the inauguration of the bank in April 1991, despite the fact that most of the controversial issues were already settled by May 1990. And yet, this is still a record time for the creation of an international organization.
Nevertheless, as with any IFI set up in the past, controversy arose over several points: amount of capital, location, decision-making and control, scope and objectives, and, not least, personnel. Thedividing line over many of these points was between France, Germany and Italy on the one hand and the USA and the UK on the other.
While France had initially advocated a much larger capital with Britain taking the opposite view, the issue was finally settled with an agreement over a capital of ECU 10 billion ($12 billion). Arguably not much when compared to the capital of other IFIs, yet -due to the denomination in ECU -stressing the European dimension. Some of the British resentment against the bank was appeased by the decision to locate the headquarters in London. US opposition focused mainly on the inclusion of the Soviet Union. It was argued that the Soviet reform process was 
Indonesia's Managed Mass Migration Transmigration between poverty, economics and ecology
The migration of autonomous settlers and of government-supported transmigrants from the heavily populated inner islands, especially Java, to the thinly populated outer islands has always played an important role in indonesian development policy. The planning and realization of the transmigration programmes has triggered off a world-wide discussion. This book provides a
